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IN THE SUPRE'1E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL F. NALTOtl, 
Plaintiff and Apoellant, 
vs. 
KENNETH F. WALTON and 
FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS & 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
Defendant and Respondent. 
District Court No. 
21341 
Supreme Court No. 
15552 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND 
APPELLANT, PAUL F. r"7ALTON 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Second Judicial 
District Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable John F. Nahlquist, District Judge. The judgment 
of the court was for the defendant and against the plaintiff, 
finding no cause of action against either Defendants. 
This is also an appeal from a subsequent order from the 
said court, filed December 7, 1977, issued by the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist of said District Court on the 5th day of 
December, 1977 accepting defendants proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, denying plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial and for an opportunity to rebut the facts 
as found by the court and for amendment of judgment and denying 
Plaintiff's motion for the nublication of a transcript to 
-1-
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be considered with plaintiff's motion for a new trial and 
for consideratio~ of the law and for an opportunity to 
rebut the facts as found by the court. 
DISPOSITION IN LO''lE~ COUR.T 
Trial in the above entitled matter was heard before 
the Honorable John F. Walhauist, District Judge, on October 
17, 18, and 19, 1977 at which time the court heard testimonies 
and received the exhibits and evidences presented by 
Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Respondent and further 
heard argument of counsel pertaining to the legal issues 
involved in the case and thereafter took the matter under 
advisement. On the 27th day of October, 1977, the court 
issued its memorandum decision containing Findings o= Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in a general statement in favor of 
the defendants and against the plaintiff. Thereafter 
the nlaintiff filed motions for a new trial and for an oopor-
tuni ty to rebut the facts as found bv the court and for an 
amendment of judgment, and objected to the Findings of 
Eact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment submitted by 
the Defendant-~espondent and further moved that in support 
of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial a publication 
of the transcript of the decosition of ~oseph Moore be made 
and considered with the plaintiff's motion to suonort their 
cause. All of the above referred to motions were denied 
and the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment of the defendants were accented. Plaintiff 
-2-
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filed his Notice of Acpeal and the case is now before 
This Honorable Court pursuant to that Notice of Apceal. 
RELIEF SOU~HT ON ADDBAL 
0 laintiff-Aonellant seeks for a reversal of the judgment 
of the said Second Judicial Distract Court of Davis County 
and further seeks for the relief prayed for in nlaintiff's 
~otion for a new trial, etc., and for 6laintiff's Motion for 
the Publication of the Transcrict of Joseph Moore's Denosition 
oerrriitting the 0 laintiff-Anpellant onoortunitv to rebut 
the facts found by the court. 
STATEHENT OF l"AC':"S 
On the 18th dav of ~av 1955, plaintiff's predecessor 
in interest, Orson F. Walton, entered into a lease agreement 
with Kenneth F. Walton, Kaysville, Utah, one of the Defendant-
Resoondents herein (Defendants exhibit 1). Thereafter, on 
or about 1971, defendant Fife Rock ?roducts and Construction 
Cornpanv began ooerating under a lease in the Nalton Gravel 
~it (T. 316 line 30; 322 lines 9-15). During the course of 
nreliminarv proceedinqs the parties filed their Motions to 
Compel Discoverv including 0 laintiff's Motion to Compel 
the Droduction of Documents recuesting that a lease between 
the defendants Kenneth F. ~alton and Fife Rock 0 roducts 
and Construction Comoanv be nrovided. Bv stioulation of 
the oarties this carticular question was taken uc on the 
~retrial conference and 0 laintiff's Motion to Compel the 
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Production of the lease between the defendants was denied 
(R. 20). Prior to 1971 and as early as sometime orior to 
1968 the defendant Fife Rock Products operated under a lease 
held by Mr. Smedley, is sued to him bv Kenneth F. v!a 1 ton 
(T. 317). It is further evident that thev were working on 
extracting gravel from the pit as early as May 29, 1962 (T. 318 
The lease terminated v'i th Fife Rock :Products the same 
time as the lease terminated between Kenneth F. Walton and 
the :Plaintiff-Appellant (?. 16). 
On or ahout 1965, after the first ten vear period of 
the old lease between Kenneth F. Walton and Orson F. Walton, 
a dispute arose as the language of the lease and as to 
whether the remainderman, Lerene Walton, the successor in 
interest to Orson F. Walton, was entitled to reenter and take 
nossession of the premises. That narticular disoute was 
concluded bv legal action and a stioulation orally oresented 
in the record of the court on the 7th dav of Julv, 1967 (P. 21 · 
By that stioulation the lease was to continue for another 
period of ten vears, after which the defendant, Kenneth 
F. Walton was to surface and terrace the land, in comoliance 
with Davis County "lanninq Commission reciuirement and fill 
in larqe caverns and holes. 
MR. PORBES: "That when the lease terminates, that 
he so surface and terrace the land to comply with the 
requirements of the Davis Countv 0 lanning Commission, 
buf specif icallv that there be ieft no large caverns 
or holes. I think that . 
~1R. KING: 'I think that covers it." 
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-'!'HE 0 LAINTIFT: "It isn't to be rene"'7ed.'' 
'1R. KI:--v;: ''That's right.'' 
~1R. FORBES: '"!'hat's right." 
The stioulation was thereafter enforced on October 23, 
1°69, and a iudgment obtained on the terms thereof. Under 
i tern Number l (CJ) thereof we read: 
'!'hat upon the termination of the said lease, the defendant 
shall comnlv with the reauirernents of the Davis Countv 
Planning Commission with respect to terracing and wili 
specificallv see to it that there are no large caverns 
or holes left unon the ?remises (0 • 1). 
The major difference between the stioulation and the judgment 
is that the judgment does not make reference to the "surfacing·• 
that the stipulation makes reference to. It should be 
concluded, ho1Vever, that that was contemolated since that was 
the stinulation of the partv. 
Little or no contact or communication occurred between 
the defendant Kenneth F. ''7alton and/or Fife Rock :Products 
Construction Comoany and the Plaintiff-A~~ellant durinq the 
vears that followed and this due to the fact that ~r. 0 aul 
D. Malton, the final successor in interest, Plaintiff-A;pellant 
herein, had been restrained and enjoined from making contact. 
~he next comrnunica ti on made bv Mr. i:>aul F. r•!al ton and 
as set forth in the evidence was his letter of the 24th 
day of March, 1975, advising that the lease hold interest 
'.vas terminating on the 18th day of '1ay, 1975, deM.anding 
that all eauinment and materials, scale and scalehouses, 
etc. be removed from the nremises by the 18th day of Mav, 1975, 
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further permittinq a period until the 18th dav of November, 
1975, for rehabilitation efforts to be made (P. 16). 
subsequent to the receiot of that letter the Defendant-
Respondent Fife Rock nroducts sent in a V-8 caterpillar 
and aooroximately 2 or 3 nersons to accomnlish the ''rehabilitac: 
work". This was accomplished within the snan of three 
8-hour work days at the most (T. 336) following the terminatio~ 
of excavation during the span of twenty years. 
Thereafter, one of the workmen oresented to n1aintiff-
Aopellant Exhibit P. 17 purporting to be a letter of release, 
releasing Fife Rock Products Company, Inc. from a further 
obligation. The said release was never signed by the 
Plaintiff-Appellant, who told them that in his ooinion 
there had been no rehabilitation efforts accomplished 
(T. 17-18 and P. 17). 
Therea~ter 1'.)laintiff wrote a letter on the 12th day of .June, 
1975, to the Davis County Planning Commission, asking: 
"T·Jill vou please look into this matter and deterrrtine 
what tvpe of rehabilitation efforts are going to be 
required of Fife Construction Comnanv bv the Countv, 
and the time frame in which such efforts might be 
expected. I would like a detailed engineering olan 
submitted, and to have anv rehabilitation efforts 
coordinated with the prooerty owners." (n. 18) 
That letter was just an inquiry to find out what Mr. Walton 
could expect in the wav of rehabilitation in the property 
itself, not really knowing what to exoect. 
On the 23rd day of June, 1975, a form letter was 
sent out to all gravel pit operators, one of which was sent 
-6-
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to Fife Rock 0 roducts, outlining the salient noints of the 
Davis Countv Excavation Ordinance, which would be required 
of all operators, particularly demanding a plan be submitted 
("'. 19). 
On Aug. 8, 1975, Mr. Joseph L. Moore, Davis County 
Planning Commission Director, sent a letter and enclosed 
a copy of Plaintiff-Apoellant's letter and requested that 
they arrange an appointment for discussions pertaining 
thereto (P. 20). 
Bv the Fife letter on February 12, 1976, it was apparent 
that one new topographical mao was submitted indicating 
the existing contour and showing ". .the areas in which 
we nerformed minor sucplemental contour sloping . 
r-ie believe this action fulfills our previous commit with 
vour office concerning this area." He then went on to 
include the l(g) clause of the judgment, Civil No. 11601, 
taken from the second nage of P.2. 
Thereafter, Mr. Joseph Moore, apcarentlv unsatisfied 
with the response of Defendant-Respondent, sent a memorandum 
to Glen Austin asking him to review the submitted rehabilitation 
Dlans or documents and to do his own study as to whether 
or not slope requirements had been met, whether there 
was any storm runo:t:f, and describing rehabilitation contours 
with no depressions, further requesting a field trio and 
reouesting notification of when said field trio would be 
taken ("'. 22). 
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The field trip was taken in the spring when the 
ground surface could be studied without snow and the ef ~ects 
of winter. That trip was taken on May 28, 1976, and a reDort 
was made by Mr. H. Glen Austin, Davis Countv Engineer, 
on the "rehabilitation of the now vacated Fife ~ravel Pit, 
at the east end of the Walton Property" (P. 23, see also 
Exhibit A, attached herewith}. The contents of this menorandum 
from "!r. Glen Austin was put in a letter dated June 3, 1?76 
to Fife Rock Products, Defendant-Resoondent (P. 24). 
The last statement of the said letter was ""'lease consider 
and act upon these statements as soon as possible. I~ 
you have anv questions, please contact our office." 
STA~E OP 'HMO OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDEnT 
It is obvious from the corresoondence between Fife and 
the Davis Countv "lanning Conunission tha.t at least Fife and 
probably Kenneth F. Walton had no intent at any time to 
perform any more than 3 days worth of caterpillar 'vork to 
rehabilitate the preMises and thRt thev were not reallv 
intent on complying with the objectives of the Davis Countv 
Excavation Ordinance of 1960 (ry. 3). mhe obvious objective 
of the Davis County Excavation Ordinance is the restoration 
or rehabilitation of excavation onerations within the a 
unincorporated areas of Davis County, emphasizing as it 
doe~ a point in time at the end of the excavation ooerations. b 
In this respect it is the same as the judgment of October 23' 01 
1969, which looks to a point in time at the termination 
-8-
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of the lease. As an aid to the rehabilitation effort, 
Chapter 6 of the said ordinance, the owner or operator 
prior to the commencement of the excavation was required 
to submit a plan for rehabilitation and specifications were 
therein provided (P. 3, page 5). The said ordinance on 
page 1, Chapter 2, under Enforcement and continuing on 
page 2, state\ that "in the performance of the duty to enforce 
the zoning, the building inspector may enter actions in the 
courts, where necessary . 
. and his failure to do so shall 
not legalize any violations of such provisions." (Emohasis 
added) 
0 robably too much emphasis at trial was put upon the 
fact that defendants never submitted a rehabilitation plan 
or that they submitted a plan which was never accepted 
formally or in fact never rejected formally. This particular 
issue is not really probative of the basic issue of whether 
or not the Defendants-Respondents in fact, at the termination 
of the lease and at the conclusion of the excavation operations 
filled their responsibility to comply with Davis County 
Planning Commission requirements with respect to terracing, 
surfacing, and filling in large holes and caverns. The 
issue of whether or not Defendant-Respondents submitted 
a rehabilitation plan at most is only probative of their 
intent or negligence or their state of mind pertaining 
to their obligations with regard to the pit. Every piece 
of correspondence from Davis County Planning Commission 
-9-
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to the Defendant-Respondents during the course of time in 
question,referring to the Defendant-Respondents' obligations 
to comply with the ordinance,~akes reference to the fact 
that the rehabilitation plan has not been submitted and one 
must be submitted (P. 4, P. 5, P. 6, P. 9, P. 10, P. 15, 
P. 20, P. 21, P. 25). 
Defendant-Respondents take the position that P. 11, 
the copy of which is attached herewith as Exhibit B, which 
is a letter dated October 7, 1971, together with defendants 
Exhibit 3, constitutes a plan that was accepted and they 
based their argument upon the fact that P. 12, P. 13, and P. 14, 
which are documents indicating a certificate of occupancy, which 
was issued subject to filing of a $10,000 bond, was in 
fact a constructive acceptance of the rehabilitation 
plan. One must quickly note that the latest document thev 
are referring to is a certificate of occuoancv issued and 
approved the 3rd day of December, 1971 (P. 14) but however 
was followed by a letter of the 7th day of December, 1971, 
4 days later, wherein the Planning Director, Rodney F. Sutton, 
. I 
makes an additional demand that rehabilitation plan be submitted. 
I (P. 15) Over the objection of Plaintiff-Appellant's Counsel, the I 
hearsay statements of Mr. Sutton, the Planning Director, 
allegedly made October through December of 1971, were admitted. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Counsel objected to statements because 
they were hearsay and not admissible under any exception 
to the Hearsay Rule and also because it was inadmissible 
-10-
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under the Statute of Frauds (T. 296, 298). The substance 
of the telephone conversation reveals that Mr. Sutton was 
still rather adamant on having a plan submitted when in 
oaraphrasing the conversation Mr. Woodland testified, 
.He told me that he felt that because the ordinance 
said plan, he had to have something in his files to fulfill 
that provision." (T. 299, line 1-3) Apparently Mr. Woodland 
countered with the argument that he has no knowledge of 
what depth they were going to be excavating and therefore 
could not submit such a plan, but still Mr. Sutton recorded: 
"That was basically it, and he still insisted that he 
have a plan of some sort, so I told him at that time 
that I would submit to him a sketch indicating the 
general contours that I felt might be usable, and allow 
that to be submitted to his file. (T. 300) 
What follows was the objectionable oortion of the 
hearsay statement, which is also inadmissable because it is 
in violation of the Statute of Frauds. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. In substance, he said, "That ought to do; that's 
okay." 
At this point in time the defendant's Exhibit No. 4 was 
submitted into evidence, which is a sketch of contours that 
~1r. Woodland prepared. 
The defendant further claimed that from the date of 
this last conversation and the submission of the sketch 
drawings there was no further mention made of a rehabilitation 
9lan bv ~r. Sutton or the defendant and no further mention 
"as made to it until 197 5, following the terrnina tion of 
-11-
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the lease. Whether or not a rehabilitation plan was ever 
submitted and whether or not a rehabilitation plan was 
ever accepted and in fact whether the Davis County Planning 
commission ever acquiesced in the requiring of a rehabilitation 
plan or whether by their failure to object they contructively 
accepted the rehabilitation plan of the Defendant-Respondent, 
is· an:· issue probative only of the state of mind of the 
defendant with regard to the submission of the rehabilitation 
plan. The main issue remains as to whether or not in fact 
rehabilitation was accomplished as a termination of the case. 
It was always the position in the correspondence and even 
in these conversations with Mr. Sutton that a full rehabilitatio~: I 
plan indicating what would be done at the end or what the 
contours might remain at the conclusion of the lease were 
held in abeyance and by the correspondence of the Defendant-
Respondent Fife and Mr. Woodland, of Fife Rock Products 
Construction Company, was that full rehabilitation plans would 
be submitted at the conclusion of the lease and/or that 
the site would be left in the condition to meet all requirements 
set up by the State (T. 299-300, P. 5 "It is our intention 
to proceed with our planned rehabilitation as soon after 
the court renders its decision as is feasible." P. 9 
"Our rehabilitation plans therefore remain in the future 
and will be done when our operations there are complete." 
The purported rehabilitation plan, the letter of October 7, 
1971, P. 11 "The contours to which the pit will be excavated 
-12-
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prior to rehabilitation are not known at this time. Test 
holes do not indicate the depth to which usable material 
exists.") This was reemphasized again in the conversation 
with Mr. Sutton as the rationale for not submitting a completed 
or finished rehabilitation plan. Under Chaper 6 of the 
Excavation Ordinance of 1960 (P. 3, page 5, Sec. 1-6-l(d) 
one of the requirements is a plan showing proposed contours 
after rehabilitation, which appears to be a difficult 
question to answer in submitting a plan. 
Again, (ii a plan was not submitted which would cover 
all requirements necessary under the ordinance; (ii) it 
was the intent of the narty, Defendant-Respondent Fife, 
to comply at the conclusion of the excavation; (iii) the 
Judgment of October 23, 1969 and the prior stipulation 
from which the Judgment was taken dated July 7, 1967 
refer to a point in time at the conclusion of the excavation 
for action to be taken by the Defendant-Respondent. 
EXPERT S~UDIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellant, after l~arriing of the defici~ncies 
as found by Glen Austin and himself being concerned about 
the rehabilitation of the property, employed the services 
of an engineering firm, Byrd Engineering, and the President 
of said company, Mr. Jim Byrd, employed the services of 
~r. Herbert Schreiter as a land planner who in turn employed 
the services of Mr. Guy Alder, who is a specialist in 
reveqetation. It was ~r. Schreiter's responsibility to 
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study the area to determine what needed to be done. Mr. 
schreiter went into the area using an instrument called 
an abney to measure slopes and a camera to take pictures 
and he followed a map provided for him by the plaintiff 
which was a map duly authenticated and admitted to evidence. 
He had the Exhibit 25, the aerial photo of the gravel pit 
and based upon his knowledge and experience of soil tyµes 
and unstable soils and conditions, Mr. Schreiter produced 
several descriptive overlay charts constituting plaintiff's 
Exhibits 26-31. P. 26 describes a general condition of 
sandy, gravel, cobbly type of material and together with 
Exhibit 27 it indicates that said materials are in some cases 
on extremely steep slopes. ~. 28 indicates that those slopes 
are not covered by any vegetation as to the present time and 
P. 29 and 29a indicate that there are approximately 29.8 
acres in need of grading and revegetation ranging from 
moderately severe to severe conditions which could result 
in erosion problems. Exhibit No. 30 describes the areas 
where slopes are rather steep, ranging from 40-60% slopes 
down to a 0-5% slope. 
Mr. Byrd and Byrd Engineering produced what is called 
a Cut and Fill Proposal and described it graphically on 
P. 36. By his estimation, there it was 143,326 cubic 
yards of material that must be removed to return the property 
to any kind of a usable condition. Mr. Byrd indicated that 
he had prior to developing this plan developed a more ideal 
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type of plan which would have required approximately 
100,000 yards more of fill to fill up the holes that 
exist but had decided to adopt a more conservative approach, 
which is the approach which he took (T. 217) which amounted 
to 143,326 cubic yards (T. 216). Nor would this more 
conservative plan which ~r. Byrd arrived at toward the 
development of a subdivision be more extravagant than any 
other kind of excavation purpose or objective. (T. 214) 
Mr. Byrd believes in his experience that the cost of moving 
the material would be approxiamtely 75¢ on the average 
per cubic yard, and that multiplied by the yardage of 
143,326 cubic yards is the projected cost for reshaping the 
ground. (T. 216-217) 
Mr. ~uy Michael Alder, President of Native Plants, Inc., 
a licensed nurseryman, landscape contractor, and holding 
an undergraduate degree in botany, a master's degree in 
biological science, specializing in plant ecology, who had 
just returned from Colorado after having received a Rocky 
Mountain Center Environment Industry Award was called to 
testify as to the needs for rehabilitation of the property. 
Mr. Alder testified that where there had been no reshaping 
of the slopes and terracing during the course of the excavation, 
that would be necessary prior to revegetation. In Transcript 
page 233, he further testified how it could have been accomplished 
during the excavation with minimal effort. (T. 2 3 4) He 
stated that whatever the degree of slope, it may or may 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not check erosion, but the checking of erosion is the main 
purpose behind rehabilitation of property after mining 
and excavation. (T. 235) 
He then testified concerning materials needed and used 
to check erosion. He used a process which was less expensive 
in that there was no spreading of soil. In place of soil 
there would be mulch and tacking material. (T. 237) The 
estimated cost for the revegetation was $2,960 per acre 
and this multiplied by 29+ acres would be the total rehabilita+ 
costs of the revegetation, and this would be separate and 
apart from the reshaping costs. (T. 241) Whatever the 
case, the reshaping alone would not accomplish the task 
without revegetation. (T. 242) 
Mr. Burke 0. Clegg, a real estate appraiser with an 
SRA professional designation, was called to testify, who 
did a "check feasability study." (T. 261) He analyzed 
all of plaintiff's property, including the lower portion 
(westerly) and the higher impacted gravel pit area (easterly) 
and described the effects of the eastern gravel pit area on 
the western property, stating that the higher propertv 
would have an adverse effect on the marketability of the 
lower area simply because of its condition. 
It was his opinion that parcel 1 was affected as follows: 
(i) If it remained as it was, it would be worth approximately 
$3000 per acre; (ii) If the above eastern portion were impro~ 
and in a better condition, it ~ould increase the value 
of the western lower property, making it worth approxima tel:1 
-16-
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$10,000 per acre, and there being 35 acres, it would be a 
difference between $350,000 and $35,000 (See T. 267 and 276) 
After hearing the testimony of Mr. Smith, who was purported 
to have done the rehabilitation work for the 3 days referred 
to above, Mr. Alder retook the witness stand as a rebuttal 
witness and testified that the procedures followed could 
not have possibly done the job. (T. 394 and 395) 
Counsel for the plaintiff, realizing that one last 
detail should be provided for the court, i.e. the standard 
that was required of Davis County Planning Commission of 
excavating by gravel pit operators on or about May 18, 
1975, attempted to call Mr. Joseph Moore back to 
the witness stand as a rebuttal witness but was unable to 
do so in that Mr. Moore was not available. Plaintiff asked 
that a deposition of Mr. Moore be admitted into evidence, 
which would accomplish the testimony and Mr. King objected 
to the deposition on the grounds that there is no showing 
the witness was outside the jurisdiction of the court or 
otherwise unavailable within the meaning of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which objection was sustained. 
Thereafter, the Court issued its judgment and its 
memorandum decision (R. 28) finding no cause of action in 
favor of both Kenneth Walton and Fife Rock Products and 
Construction Company. Thereafter, plaintiff filed his ·~otion 
for a New Trial and for an opportunity to rebut the facts 
as found by the Court pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure, but that motion was denied. (R. 44 and 
R. 47) The motion was brought as it states because the Court 
had found, 
"This ordinance (Excavation Ordinance of 1960) was 
never enforced so far as the provisions "rehabilitation 
of landn were involved, but was enforced as to dust 
noise, and other factors." 
The Court further found, 
"The Planning Commission has never, during the period 
of time in question requested the submission of a 
rehabilitation plan of any gravel mine except the 
defendant Fife in this case, and thisV 2quest was 
made at plaintiff ~alton's insistence.• 
The intent behind putting Mr. Moore back on the witness 
stand as a rebuttal witness had been to rebut that position 
that had been advanced by the defendant. Being unable 
to do so during trial, plaintiff moved for an opportunity 
to rebut under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Having denied the motion, the Court turned its back on 
further facts which could have aided in overcoming those 
assumptions upon which the Court had made its findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURTS' JUDGMENT IS FATALLY 
DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT IS BASED UPotl A 
THEORY OF ESTOPPEL OF A ~OVERNMENTAL 
AGENCY WHICH IS NOT POSSIBLE U!JDER 
THE LAVi. 
The Court made reference to the provision in judgment 
of October 23, 1969 (P. 1, page 2) under DaragraDh l(g) 
wherein the Court held that Kenneth l'i'al ton was, upon terminati' 
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of said lease obligated to "comply with requirements of 
Davis County :Olanning Commission with respect to terracing" 
and to see to it that there are no large caverns or holes 
left upon the premises. The Court stated that that particular 
provision was a judgment which continued on the relationshio 
that started in 1955 and 
.that the obligation of terracing, etc. would 
affect not only the diggings taking place after 1967 
when the stipulation was made or 1969 when the judgment 
was entered, but also dates back to 1955 when the 
digging was first begun in so far as Kenneth F'. Walton 
is concerned.·• (R. 38) 
These provisions in the judgment together with the 
ordinance (P. 3) as well as the defendants themselves always 
look to the future at the end of the excavation to determine 
their obligations and to plan out the rehabilitation of 
the gravel pit. 
The Court, however, in its Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated that: 
(5) This ordinance (Excavation Ordinance of 1960) 
was never enforced insofar as the provisions 
"rehabilitation of lands" were inv~lved, but was enforced 
as to dust, noise, and other factors. 
(7) The request was made by the former Director 
of the Davis County Planning Commission, now deceased, 
for "something to be put in the file" and was not 
carefully examined or considered by the Davis Countv 
Planning Commission, and no action was taken by the 
Davis County Planning Commission within the thirty (30) 
davs allowe~ by the ordinance to disapprove such a 
plan, and therefore the submitted rehabilitation plan 
by letter of Fife Rock Products Company of October 7, 
1971 and material subseouently submitted in connection 
therewith must be deemed to have been accepted by 
the Davis County Planning Commission as a "rehabilitation 
olan." 
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(8) The Fife "rehabilitation clan" referred to above 
did satisfy the then existing standards and was accepted 
bv the Davis County Planning Commissions lack of 
action after the period of time required by the 
Ordinance as referred to above. 
(11) The Court finds that the mining in Question was 
done in accordance with the then prevailinq customs 
and usage' in the mining field and that there is no 
waste per se proven in this case. 
(14) * * * . Such a theory of action requires 
that a scar on the surface of the mountain be left in 
violation of the law as the law then existed and also 
in violation of the prevailing general then in existence. 
The Court, however, in this case does not find that such 
was oroven, but does, in fact, find that the rehabilitatio: 
of lands were in accordance with the then prevailing 
standards of 1975 in Davis County area and throughout 
the general area of the Wasatch front and, therefore, 
also in accordance with the judgment of October 23, 
1969. 
The Court is outlining by the above reference statements, 
the theory of estoppel, which,' in essence states that Davis 
County Planning Commission is estopped in 1975 to demand 
rehabilitation of the property because they have, prior 
to that time, through their inaction, lulled the defendant, 
Fife, into believing that their conduct was acceptable 
and that the defendant, Fife, thereby relied upon said 
inaction and therefore, Davis County Planning Commission 
is now estooped to demand performance under the Davis County 
Excavation Ordinance. 
Estoppels against the oublic are little favored. 
They should not be invoked exceot in rare and unusual 
circumstances, and mav not be i~voked where they will 
operate to defeat the-effective operation of the policies 
adopted to protect the public. (31 C.J.S. Estoopel, 
Sec. 138, p. 675) -
If estoppel is permitted at anv time against a governmenta 
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agency, it would be in respect to matters which are proprietary 
or private enterprise types of matters as opposed to 
governmental or public matters. ~here is no auestion but 
what the Davis County Planning Commission was not the owner 
of any property from which it could be concluded they were 
acting in a Proprietary function, but were, in fact, using 
mere police powers. 
As is sometimes stated, eauitable estoppel mav be 
invoked against the United States, a s~~te, a-municiPal 
corporation, or other governmental agency or instrumentality 
in respect to acts done in its proprietary or private 
capacity, as is distinguished from its governmental 
or oublic caoacity in its strict scone of which it 
cannot be estopped (31 C.J.S. Sec. 138, p.676-677) 
If the Court found that this was the proprietary 
function, it would still not constitute estoppel under the 
circumstances and the facts in this case. The defendants 
could not be said to have relied upon any representation 
action or inaction of the agency, especially under the 
circumstances where the ordinance clearly describes what 
their duties and responsibilities are and further where the 
ordinance stated under Chapter 2, Enforcement 1-2-2: 
Where it is determined by the zoning and building 
inspector that excavation is proceeding not in comPliance 
with the provisions of this ordinance, he shall 
enforce the Provisions of this ordinance, and in 
Performance of his duty, may enter actions in the court, 
where necessarv and his failure to do so shall not legalize 
any violations" of such provisions. (P. 3, page 2) 
(Emphasis added) 
Nor is there any estoppel against a governmental 
agency notwithstanding the oroprietarv finding where: 
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... such agencies lack the essential knowledge or 
intent or where the person claiming estonpel did not 
rely, or should not have relied, upon the representation 
action or inaction of the agency as where the person 
asserting the estopoel was not misled, or where he 
could have learned the facts by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, or where he was not injured as a result 
of the act or statement of the government body. 
Furthermore, there can no estoppel where the oerson 
setting it up failed to act in good faith; and no amount 
of representation can prevent the government from 
asserting as illegal that which the law declares to 
be such. (31 C.J.S. Sec. 133 p. 683-685) 
So it is that estoopel is not a proper theorv to bring 
against the government or its agencies in failing to act 
or to enforce the law or in any way to void the law in its 
effect and sancion upon any oerson. The Supreme Court o~ 
the State of Utah has by their decisions supported this 
view that where city officials or governmental officials 
failed to act as they should in their position estoppel 
would not serve as a defense to anv rights and uowers exercisec 
We find the exact same situation as is being charged by 
the Defendant-Respondents in this case. In the case of 
Tooele City vs. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406, the 
city of Tooele, State of Utah, sought to quiet title to a 
strip of land alleged to have been dedicated as an 
allev. There were a number of conveyances in reference 
to said property, beginning in ,July of 1872 and continuing 
on to March of 1938. In each and every convevance, the city 
plat was recognized as the legal description of the property. 
The defendants and appellants based their titles of propertv 
uoon two grounds, (1) the city had deeded them the nroperty 
of the quick claim deed and thereby relinquished all right 
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the city might have had in the property and (2) the property 
was never owned nor dedicated as an alley by the city and 
if it did have any rights in the property they have long 
since been waived and lost. The alley or property had never 
been open to the Public as a public thoroughfare. The 
Court held that the property had been dedicated as a street 
and therefore could not have been conveyed in 1938 to the 
defendants and also the mere failure to have implemented 
the use of the said alleyway as a street by officers who 
should act within the authority granted could not be reasons 
for abrogating the community interest. For those reasons, 
the argument of estoppel in pais could not be claimed as 
against the city. (Ibid. page 410) 
A similar case arose in the case of Cox vs. Carlisle. 
(369 P.2d 1049) Plaintiff-Appellant claimed to have acquired 
title over the manv many years from the date the said property, 
a 66-foot strip of land was deeded to the city of Manti on 
September 2, 1872. Since that year, plaintiff and her predecessor 
had made improvements in connection with the area. Notwith-
standing, these improvements and the use of the property the 
court held that the mere fact that the government over 
the many years permitted plaintiff the use thereof did 
not work as an estoppel against the government in claiming 
the interest and ownership of said property. There were 
various reasons given, including the fact that neither 
nlaintiff nor others had ever paid any taxes on the property 
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since or before 1831 and Manti has claimed no taxes thereon. 
In this particular case, silence and inaction by the city 
of Manti did not abrogate its right and claims to said 
property and therefore the estoppel argument did not lie 
against the City of Manti. 
In the case of Morgan vs. Board of State Lands, 
(549 P.2d 695) (1976) ~organ had an oil shale land lease for 
a period of ten years and at the expiration of the ten vears 
received another rent notice and paid the same. The Board 
of State Lands thereafter attempted to terminate the lease 
or claim or treat it as terminated and the Utah Supreme Court 
held that, notwithstanding the Board's mistake in issuing 
the rental notice and their failure to publish the regulations 
pertaining to the renewal of leases and their otherwise 
negligent acquiescence or iriaction and notwithstandirig the 
lessee relied thereon, the said Board of State Lands 
is not estopped from denying extension of the said lease 
for another ten years. Again this case stands for the 
proposition that public officials may not perform their duty 
and responsibility. Notwithstanding that inaction of failure, 
it cannot be held that said government body is estopped 
from enforcing the regulations or laws which they are entitled 
to enforce. These arguments and theories have been clearly 
set out in 31 C.J.S. Sec. 138, P. 686-688· 
Mere acquiescence, laches laose of time, or nonaction 
on the oart of the public
1
or the public agent or 
officer does not ordinarily work an estoppel. No 
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estoppel ordinarily results from acquiescence in the 
violation of law and it has been held that no estopoel 
results ordinarily from the failure to collect fees-
or from delay in bringing suit. 
POINT II 
AN ESTOPPEL AGAINST A THIRD PERSON 
FOR INACTION OR AC(IUIESCENCE MY 
NOT WORK AS AN ESTOPPEL UPON THE 
PARTY PLAINTIFF IN HIS ACTION 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
It is indeed a pecul!iar doctrine that Mr. Paul Walton 
must be held to have his rights of action rise or fall upon 
the conduct of a third party over whom he has no control. 
Paul Walton, never at any time by his own contact led the 
defendant, Fife or Kenneth Walton to believe that they could 
sit back and fail to comply with the ordinance. The court 
should look to the myriads of correspondence surrounding 
the termination of the lease and the demands and requirements 
imposed by Davis County Planning Commission. Mr. Joseph 
Moore stated that his action in this case was due to other 
pressures beyond the case involving Mr. Walton's property and 
that he was in fact imposing the same controls and requirements 
upon all excavations throughout the county. (T. 66 lines 10-14, 
page 93, line 24 through page 94 line 7) So it is that Mr. 
~alton did not play any part in the inaction on the part of 
Davis County Planning Commission, their enforcement of the 
nrdinance at the time nor any detriment which mav have worked 
upon Defendant-Respondent. 
The most important factor, however, is that estoppel 
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which the Court has obviously imposed upon Davis County 
Planning commission is working to the detriment of the 
Plaintiff-Appellant, who was not a party to the conduct or 
to any inaction of the part of the Planning Commission. 
As stated, it seems improbable that the evidence will indicate 
that Mr. Paul F. lflalton at any time ratified the action 
of Davis County Planning Commission when, in fact, the judgment 
itself speaks of a time at the termination of the lease 
as of May 18, 1975 when the property is to be surfaced 
and terraced in compliance with Davis County 1? lanning Commissio: 
requirements. Mr. Walton was not in a position to police and 
control what went on with regard to the gravel pit and was 
otherwise entitled himself to rely upon the Ordinance and 
its enforcement. 
Otherwise, the Davis County Planning Commission stands 
between Mr. Walton and Fife Rock Products and Kenneth F. 
Walton and the only way that estoppel could operate between 
Kenneth F. T'1alton, Fife Rock Products and the plaintiff would 
be by some notion of a "third party beneficiary estoppel" 
which is a notion totally foreign or alien to the law. 
Persons to whom representatives are directed and 
whose conduct thay-are intended to, and do, influence 
may take advantage of a plea of estoppel. 
* * * 
Estoppels operate as to or between, and as to or between 
the parties to the subject matter or transaction which 
is the basis of the estoppel and their privies, either 
in blood, in estate, or in law. (31 C.J.S. EStopoel, 
sec. 130, p. 661-662) 
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Estoppels in pais are available against parties 
in privity, whether the privity be by blood, by estate, 
or by contract, provided the privity is create~ after 
the event out of which the estoppel arises. (31 C.J.S. 
Estoppel, Sec. 131, p. 665-666) 
There is no privity of contract or privity of relationship 
out of which an estoppel may arise between Paul F. !<Talton and 
the defendants herein because of the intervening relationship 
of Davis County Planning Commission. If there were a possible 
law of estoppel against the governmental agency (which 
there is not) or if the courts should by some notion find 
there was a proorietary function or some legal basis upon 
which estoppel could be asserted against Davis County Planning 
Commission, it would still be defective because there 
exists no relationship out of which the said estoppel arose 
between Plaintiff-Appellant herein and Defendants-Respondent. 
DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED THEIR Ril;HT TO 
ASSERT DEFENSE OF ESTOPPEL BY FAILING 
TO PLEAD ESTOPPEL UNDER RULE 8 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OR TO 
MOVE AFFIR'1ATIVELY UPON THE SAID DEFENSE 
PRIOR TO TRIAL. AS A RESULT THE SAID 
DEFENSE !VAS NOT BEFORE THE COURT, AND 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ON ITS 01•7N CREATE 
SUCH A DEFENSE IN ITS JUDGMENT. 
If the court were able to suppress the above referred 
to points of law and find that estoppel was available 
as a defense, said estoppel is an affirmative defense 
and should have been pleaded affirmatively under Rule 8 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads: 
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(c) Affirmative Defenses. In oleading to a preceeding 
pleading, the parties shall set forth affirmatively 
accord and satisfaction arbitration award, assumntion 
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge and 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, 
fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata. statute of 
fraud, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting avoidance or affirmative defense. 
(Emphasis added) 
This was not alleged affirmatively and therefore, was 
not a matter before the Court, nor did this defense arise 
as a result of any defense under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Every defense in law or fact, to claim full relief 
in anv nleading, whether a claim, counter claim, 
cross claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted 
in the responsive pleading thereto if one is reauired. 
(h) Naiver of Defenses. A oartv waives all defenses 
and objections which he does-not oresent either bv 
motion as herein before orovided or if he has made 
no motion in his answer or reply 
Having not either pleaded the theory of estop~el as 
an affirmative defense or having entered into a motion 
to assert that evidence said defense was waived. 
POIN'!' IV 
TRIAL COURT ~msT LOOK TO THE DE.''!ANDS 
OF DAVIS COUNTY PL_l\NNING CQr1Jl'ISSION 
SUBSEQUENT TO MAY 18, 1975 BECAUSE 
THIS IS THE "'I'1E SE'J' AS llE\'? CONSIDERATIOH 
ON l')R ABOUT ,JULY 7 I 1%7 IN ".'HE 01'.AL 
STIPULATI01'J ''7HICH '·IAS P.EDUCRD '1'0 ,TTJD"'IBNT 
ON OCTOBER 23, 1969 A".'!D AS NEToJ CO"TSIDERA'!'IO~T 
THE ORIGINAL OBLI~ATIONS OP THE PARTIES 
11ERE CHANGED. 
It should be noted at this point that whether or not 
a rehabilitation plan was submitted is reallv irrelevant 
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in that it is not orobative as to the renuirements imposed 
upon the defendant to rehabilitate under the stipulation 
and judgment. At most, it is only probative of the issue 
whether or not the defendants were negligent or were of 
a state of mind not to perform as they were suonosed to 
under the Excavation Ordinance of 1960 and/or obey the 
Planning Commission requirements as thev were made or demanded 
during the years. One must consider the intent or nurpose 
of the rehabilitation plan to aid both the defendants and 
the Davis County Planning Commission in determining what 
the outcome of the excavation would be and to guide the said 
oarties to a proper and agreeable conclusion. 
New consideration amounted to a 10-year extension 
of the existing lease to the benefit of defendants. New 
consideration accruing to plaintiff's benefit was and is 
set forth in the following language~ 
FROM THE ORAL STIPULATION OF cTULY 7, 1967: 
11R. FO«.BES · That when the lease terminates, that he 
so surface and terrace the land to comnlv with the 
requirements of the Davis County Planning Commission, 
but specifically that there be left no large caverns 
or holes. 
FROM THE JUDr:;MEN':' OF OC"'.'OBER 2 3 ' 19 6 9 : 
1. (g) that upon the termination of said lease, Defendant 
shall comply with the reauirements of the Davis Countv 
Planning Commission with respect to terracing and 
will soecificallv see to it that there are no large 
caverns or holes' left uoon the premises. 
Included within the new consideration established 
in the ,Julv 7, 1967 oral stioulation would be all the 
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demands or requirements imposed by the Davis Countv Planning 
commission in terracing and surfacing and filling in all 
large holes and caverns as those needs may be discovered 
following May 18, 1975. 
POP\IT V 
THE DEFENDANT FIFE ROCK PRODUCTS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IS ALSO LIABLE 
UNDER THE LEASE AS IT T'7AS ~10DP"'IED 
BY THE ORAL STIPULATION OF JULY 7, 
1967 AND THE OCTOBER 23, 1969 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETT•7EEN THE DE"'ENDANTS HEREIN WAS 
THAT OF ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE 
INSTEAD OF THAT OF A SUBLESSOR 
AND SUBLESSEE. 
Where (al a tenant sublets all of his interest to 
his subtenant, or (bl by his conduct transfers all of his 
interest to a subtenant and {c) the sublease terminates 
at the same time as the original lease with no reversion 
back to the tenant, the legal relationship between the 
tenant and the subtenant is assignment instead of a sublease 
which will establish obligations and ?rivitv of contract 
between a landlord and assignee or subtenant. 
It is generallv recognized that an assignment of 
a term for years occurs where the lessee transfers 
his entire interest therein without retaining any 
reversionary interest. If an instrument so transfers 
the lessee's interest, it constitutes an assignment, 
regardless of its character and form; and it is 
freouentlv been so held where the instrument of 
transfer is in the form of a lease, a sublease or a 
conveyance by the lessee of the oremises bv deed and 
fee, or by a-quick claim deed, or by deliverv of the 
lease to the past signee, dulv endorsed to him, the 
endorsement reciting the transfer of all the lessee's 
right, title, and interest in the lease. ~evertheless, 
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in order to constitute an assignment, the lessee must 
part with his entire interest in the whole or in 
oart of the premises. (51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenants, 
Sec. 31(1) p. 103-104) 
It is further an estoppel to deny assignment when 
the conduct of the parties is such that it constitutes 
an assignment instead of a lease. 
Estoppel to Deny Assignment. Conduct inconsistent 
with another relation may estop a person to deny that 
there has been an assignment of the terms. (P. 104) 
An example of the existence of an assignment of a lease 
rather than a sublease is demonstrated by the situation 
which the third party, sublessee, undertakes the rights 
and obligations of the original lease with the consent of 
the lessor. In the case of Ernst vs. Conditt 54 Tenn. Aoo. 
328, 390 S.W. 2d 703, the third party undertook rights 
and obligations under the lease with the consent of the 
lessor, and the Court held that the agreement constituted 
and assignment of the lease, rather than a sublease, 
notwithstanding the lessee agreed to remain personally 
liable for performance of covenant and the lessor consented 
to the agreement. In the case at bar, the evidence showed 
that Fife undertook to discharge all the obligations of 
Kenneth F. Walton by even taking upon himself the requirement 
to fill the Court's order as set forth in the Judgment of 
October 23, 1969. In so doing, thev wrote a letter to Davis 
County Planning Commission in which they recognized the 
judgment and the terms of the judgment as thev related 
Kenneth F. Walton and themselves stated that this was 
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their comrnittment. (P.21) 
WASTE DEFINED 
POINT VI 
THE DEFENDANT, ~IPE ROCK PRODUCTS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, COMMITTED ''lASTE 
PER SE AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF BY 
VIOLATING A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE 
AND/OR REQUIRE'1ENTS OF' DAVIS COUNTY 
PLANNING COM-1'HSSIO~J 
The ela~ents essential to a cause of action for waste 
are as follows: 
1. The waste statute creates for the Plaintiff-
Appellant herein his cause of action in tort. The duty 
established is one of due care not to injure the property 
of any person who has a legal interest in property legallv 
in the possession of the tortfeasor. 
If a guardian, tenant for life or years, joint tenant 
or tenant in corrunon of real property commits waste 
thereon, any person aggrieved by the waste may bring 
an action against him therefore, in which action there 
may be a judgment for treble damages. (Emnhasis added) 
{U .C .A. 78-28-2 (1953) 
This particular provision falls under Chapter 28 of 
Title 78 of the Utah Code Annotated which deals with Torts 
to Real Property and is entitled "Nuisance, Waste, and Other 
Damage.'' There are only four verses to this Chanter 38, 
the title of Verse 1 is "Nuisance". The title of the second 
one is "Waste". The title of the third is "Injury to 
Trees-Damage'', and the fourth is "Limited Damages in Certain 
Cases". These three sections use common phrases. !"or 
example, in 78-38-1 we read ''any person whose property 
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is injuriously affected" and 73-38-2 "any cerson aggrieved 
by the waste", and in 78-38-3 "any person 
. is liable 
to the owner of such land. It is noted from these 
sections and particular section 73-28-2 that the tort 
against property does not depend upon a prior existing 
legal relationship but is like any other tort action in 
which the cause of action arises due to the conduct of the 
one party which is negligent or intentional or in other 
words breaches some duty due and owing to the owner of the 
property which results in injury to the said property. 
So it is in nuisance that the action is based ucon smell, 
escapage of water, and myriad of other kinds of noxious, 
indecent or offensive acts which any person in use of their 
own property adjacent or nearby the property of the complainant 
which results in damage or injury to the said complainant's 
property. The question of privity of contract is an irrelevant 
principle to the concept of torts. 
2. The act constituting waste must have been done 
by one legally in possession, and that act must be to the 
prejudice of the estate or interest therein of another. 
(Jody vs. Guerdin 10 Ariz. App. 205, 457 P.2d 45 (1969) 
... it mav be defined to be an unlawful act or an 
admission of duty on the part of the tenant which results 
in a permanent injury to the interitance. It is a 
violation of an obligation to treat the premises in 
such a manner that no harm be done to them and that 
the estate mav revert to those having an underlying 
interest undeteriorated by any willful or negligent 
act. (93 C.J.S. ~aste Sec. 1, p. 559-560; Dorsev vs. 
Soeelman, 1 ''lash . .Z\.pc. 85, 459 ?.2d 416 (1969). 
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LANDLORD VS. SUBTENANT 
The proposition that waste is a cause of action which 
may be brought against the subtenant by the olaintiff, 
Paul F. Walton, who is the remainder-man, who currently 
owns the property as a result of its reversion to him is 
further supported by 93 C.J.S. Waste, Sec. 11 wherein we read 
Waste by Assignee, Subtenant, or Licensee. 
Thus one who enters by authority or permission of 
or under a contract with, the tenant, is liable to 
the remainderman for waste, and may be enjoined on 
his petition. (P. 567) 
The United States District Court, for the Southern 
District of Mississippi held in an action by a remainderman 
against a lessee, Humble Oil and Refining Company, the defendan'. 
as a purchaser from the life tenant or trustee, was charged 
with knowledge about the powers of the remainderman and his 
interest and the plaintiff was held to have the right of 
action against said subtenant for the value of all minerals 
and properties extracted from the property. (Martin vs. 
Humble Oil and Refining Company 199 Fed. Sup. 648 (1960) 
p. 651) The Court said: 
.. a life tenant is charged with notice of the extent 
of the life tenancv and of the right of the tenant 
to deal with the p~operty, and if the life tenant 
exceeds his authority the one purchasing from him 
is not relieved from the obligation to resoond to 
damages to the remainderman for waste . 
This was a case in which the defendant, Humble Oil 
and ~efining Company, was being sued and the rel~tionshio 
with the remainderman ~1artin was only that of a tortfeasor 
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and the duty arose under a theory of tort since Humble Oil 
and Refining Company was a subtenant under the life tenant 
with no privy of contract with the remainderrnan. 
!1!ASTE PER SE 
It is further obvious that the defendants have committed 
waste per se against the plaintiff. In order to prove 
a case on waste per se the plaintiff must (i) show the damage 
to the plaintiff was caused by negligence in failing to 
obey an ordinance which was created for the ourpose of 
protecting individuals like the plaintiff and (ii) that 
the said violation was the cause of plaintiff's injury 
or damage. It must (iii) further show that the conduct 
of the defendant, Fife Rock Products Construction Company 
was such that it could not be excused or justified. 
(Christensen vs. Lelas Automatic Transmission Service, Inc., 
24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970); Klafta vs. Smith, 
17 Utah 2d 65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965); Thompson vs. Ford Motor 
Company, 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 ?.2d 62 (1964); Ellis vs. Hale, 
13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962); Arbuckle vs. Wasatch 
Land and Improvement Companv, 120 Utah 338, 234 P.2d 
697 (1951); Hidalgo vs. Cochise County, 13 Ariz. App. 27, 
474 P.2d 34 (1970); Routh vs. Ouinn, 20 C. 2d 488 127 P.2d 
1 (1942); Curtis vs. O.R.S. Neon Corporation, 147 C.A. 
2d 186, 305 P.2d 294 (1957); Landbought vs. Pavton, 147 
Colo. 207, 363 P.2d 167 (1961); Stachniewicz vs. Mar-Carn 
Corporation, 259 Or. 583, 488 n.2d 436 (1971) 
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ORDINANCE PROVISIONS VIOLATED 
The careful reading of the Ordinance of 1960 controlling 
excavation will provide an indication of what the Ordinance 
was attempting to accomplish. Under 1-1-1, entitle "Puroose", 
we read that the purpose of the Ordinance is to 
"establish ... safeguards and controls on excavation 
within the unincorporated areas of Davis County, and 
to insure the excavation operations will be rehabilitated 
to a condition of oractical usefulness and reasonable 
physical attractiv~ness ... (and to orovide protection 
bf the tax base, provide for the economical ~se of 
vital materials necessary for economy and give due 
consideration to the present and future use of the 
land) in the interest of promoting the public health, 
safety, and general welfare. (Emohasis added) 
It is obvious that the user of this land will be 
Mr. Paul F. Walton, the individual to whom the land has 
reverted. (P. 3, p. 1) Under the Chapter 5 of that ordinance, 
designated as 1-5-1 and subparagraph (at end) "Excavation 
and Backfilling": 
(1) Where backfilling is required, the excavation 
shall be graded or backfilled with non-noxious, non-
flammable, non-compustible solids. The materials 
used or the method of fill shall not be such as to 
create a health hazard or which would be objectionable 
because of odor or unsightliness. 
(2) The graded or backfilled area shall not collect 
and permit stagnant water to remain thereon. 
(3) ~he peaks and depressions of the excavation 
area shal~reduced to a surface which will result 
in level or gently sloping topography in substantial 
conformity to the land area immediately surrounding 
and which will minimize erosion due to rain fall. 
(4) In any rehabilitation procedure which takes place 
in sand and gravel pits or on other sites where the 
material is of loose or friable nature, no slope shall 
be left which is steener than a ratio of l 1/2 horizontal 
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to 1 vertical. In no case shall anv sloce exceed 
the normal angle of repose of the material involved. 
(P. 3, p. 4-5) (Emohasis added) 
VIOLATIONS CAUSED PLAINTIFF APPELLANTS DAMAGES 
The evidence overwhelmingly establishes as a matter of 
law that the basic objectives of this Excavation Ordinance 
were not achieved by Defendants upon the termination of 
the lease. 
SLOPES TOO STEEP TO STABILIZE 
Glenn Austin, Davis County Engineer, after visiting 
the site, May 28, 1976, made a report which indicated that 
there was a sand hill upon which the sand was sliding down, 
considerable erosion was taking place, there were places 
in which there was no vegetation, a general need for storm 
drainage control to prevent erosion, and a ~~~eral neea 
of regrading and revegetation. (P.23, See also the testimony 
of the Davis County Planning Commission Director, Joseph 
Moore, T. 102 and the testimony of Glenn Austin, the 
Davis County Engineer, T. 134-135, Herb Schreiter, T. 184, 
192 and Guy Alder, T. 243 lines 17-22, See also photographs 
P-38, P-39, and P-48) 
EROSION PROBLEMS 
After Mr. Austin's review of the property, and his 
findings as indicated above a rather comprehensive study 
was undertaken by Plaintiff-Appellant using professional 
land design planners, vegetation experts and engineers. 
Mr. Herbert Schreiter, duly qualified in the field of 
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land planning, and designing, made a study of the sight and 
took picture of the conditions of the propertv. He discovered 
enormous erosion problems, (See photographs P-37, P-40, 
P-41, P-42, P-43, P-46, and P-50, Also see T. 180, 182, 
183, and 189) Mr. Guy Alder, an eminent authority in the 
State of Utah on excavation rehabilitation, and the President 
of Native Plants, Incorporated, also employed as an expert 
to study the conditions on the site summarized the erosion 
problem, stating, 
"In my estimation, the complete revegetation of this 
site would probably not occur within the duration 
that we could predict, because of the erosive forces 
that have begun to undercut the natural revegetation 
that has occurred. So it would be very difficult for 
us to ever assume that the site by itself could 
control the erosion that is now undercutting." (T.243) 
That which one needs to look to determine if the 
Excavation Ordinance of 1960 has been complied with or 
violated is whether "the excavation operations (have been 
rehabilitated) to a condition of practical usefulness 
and reasonable physical attractiveness ... (providing) 
protection of the tax base ... (giving) due consideration 
the present and future use of the land." (P.3 Chapter 1, 
Sec. 1-1-1 Purpose) 
More specifically this Honorable Court needs to determine 
if the backfilling and "terracing" and "surfacing" (P.l and 
P.2) was accomplished by defendants of whether the property 
was left in a condition that was: 
(1) "objectionable ... (as unsightly)" and whether 
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"The graded or backfilled area (was such as to) collect 
and permit stagnant water to remain thereon .. , 
(2) The peaks and deoressions of the excavation area 
(were) reduced to a surface which will result in level 
or gently slooing topography in conformitv to the 
land area immediatelv surrounding and which will minimize 
erosion due to rain fall. 
(3) .. (the slopes exceeded) the normal angle 
of repose of the material involved. (P. 3, p. 4-5) 
If they were not, the Ordinance was violated. If the 
Ordinance was violated, Defendant-Respondents committed 
waste per se. 
In determining whether there has been such violation 
of a statute or ordinance as mav constitute negligence, 
regard must be had to the purnose of the enactment, 
the dangers or hazards against which it was intended 
to afford protection, and the harm or injuries ,,.,hich 
it was intended to prevent or guard against. 
INCIDENTAL PURPOSES. In order that one may be entitled 
to the henefit of a statute or ordinance imposing 
a dutv, it is not necessary that the nrirnarv purnose 
of the enactment should have been to protect him, 
but it is sufficient that his protection was one of 
the ournoses intended. (65 C.J.S. Negligence Sec. 19 
(5) po. 632-633) 
The language of the Ordinance contemplates the orotection 
of the user of the land or the "future use~ of the land, 
and therefore should protect Plaintiff-Appellant herein. 
If defendant did commit waste per se, the customs and usage 
in the industrv will not shelter Defendant-Respondents 
from liability under the law. 
CUST0~1 A'W USAGE AS EXCUSE OR .TUSTIFICATION 
Custom and usage in the industry is specificallv excluded 
as a defense of excuse or justification for violating an 
ordinance. The District Court in its Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law, on page 4, beginning with item 11 
and continuing on through item 14 on page 5, states the 
following: 
11. The Court finds that the mining in question was 
done in accordance with the then prevailing customs 
and usage in the mining field and that there is no 
waste per se proven in this case. (Emphasis added) 
12. The Court finds that the mining was lawfully 
done and that while the area left is unpleasant 
in appearance and might by some future standards 
be deemed to be a nuisance if created at a future 
date, that the standards at the time the mining was 
done and rehabilitation completed were in accordance 
with the then existing law and Judgment of October 23, 
1969. (Emphasis added) 
13. The Court recognizes and finds that in a proper 
case, there is a possible cause of action in the hands 
of a remainderman for waste committed by a sub-tenant. 
However, in this case the Court does not find the 
facts supporting such a cause of action. 
14. The Court recognizes and finds that in a proper 
case, a remainderman of even an adjoining landowner 
might bring a successful action against a person who 
created unsightly scars on a mountain-side and did 
not rehabilitate the area so as to comply with the 
requirements of law, and thereby might be guilty 
of the creation of a nuisance which had a tendencv to 
suppress local land values of not only the remainder-
man but adjoining land users and might be declared 
an unlawful nuisance. Of course, such a theorv of 
action requires that the scar on the surface of the 
mountain be left in violation of law as the law then 
existed and also in violation of the prevailing general 
standards then in existence. The Court, however, in 
this case does not find that such has been proven, 
but does in fact find that the rehabilitation of the 
lands in this case was in accordance with the then 
prevailing standards of 1975 in the Davis Countv area 
and throu~hout the general area of the Wasatch ~ront 
and, therefore, also in accordance with the Judgment 
of October 23, 1969. (Emphasis added) (R. 39-40 
It is obvious from the Court Findings of Fact that 
the Court is heavily relvino upon what the customs and usages 
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are in the industry at the time. This is not a proper 
justification or excuse from a negligence per se finding. 
A survey of Court decisions will show that they tend to turn 
on whether or not the violation of the statute was something 
that was necessary under the circumstances or that the 
circumstances were beyond the control of the violator in 
order to excuse said violator from the obligations and 
duties imposed by the statute or ordinance. 
Custom and usage, however, is nowhere accepted as an 
excuse from the obligations and duties imposed by a statute 
or ordinance. 
Effective Custom. Effective violation of a statute 
or ordinance as negligent, or negligence per se, 
is not changed by the fact that the acts complained 
of were done in accordance with the custom or practice 
of persons engaged in the same line or work. Evidence 
of custom and practice may not be used to contravene 
a statutory duty of care. (65 C.J.S. Negligence, 
Sec. 19 (8) p. 641, Hom vs. Clark, 23 Cal. Rptr. 11, 
221 C.A. 2d 255, McDonald vs. Foster Memorial Hospital, 
170 C.A. 2d 85, 338 P.2d 607 (1959); Sanchez vs. J. 
Baron Rice, Inc., 77 N.M. 717, 427 P.2d 240 (1967) 
POINT VII 
THE COURT COMMITTED A PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY ADMITTING IN HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
AND STATEMENTS THAT WERE INADMISSABLE 
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Court committed prejudicial error in admitting 
the testimony of Mr. Clifford Woodland when during the 
second day of trial he testified concerning a telephone 
conversation with Mr. Sutton, the previous director of 
the Davis county Planning Commission as follows: 
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... he still insisted that he have a plan of some 
sort, so I told him that at that time that I would 
submit to him a sketch indicating the general contours 
that I felt might be usable, and allowed that to 
be submitted to his file." 
Q. What did he say? 
A. In substance, he said, "That ought to do; that's 
okay." (T. 300) 
This statement was a preface to the admission of Exhibit 
No. 4 by the defendants which was a sketch of contours 
submitted apparently pursuant to that conversation. 
Thereafter, inaction of Davis County Planning Commission 
in failing to require a rehabilitation plan together with 
the issuance of an occupation permit on or about December, 1971 
became a prejudicial error in that it was supportive of the 
fact that the defendants in fact had submitted an acceptable 
rehabilitation plan. Plaintiff objected to the submission 
of this tesimony as hearsay and also inadmissible under 
the Statute of Frauds. (T. 296, 298) 
Thereafter a statement by a Mr. Smith pertaining to 
an alleged conversation in which Mr. !1/alton, who was purported 
to have said that their excavation efforts to rehabilitate 
were not to destroy the road into the gravel pit. The use 
of this testimony was to describe that the Plaintiff-Aooella~ 
had himself obstructed the rehabilitation effort. A 
caterpillar operator, Mr. Ewing, was purported to have 
been approached by Mr. Paul F. Walton and instructed not 
to destroy the road. The statement of Mr. rvalton was then 
told to Mr. Smith and !"1r. Smith told '1r. '1loodland. 
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In other words, it was a statement purported to have been 
made by Mr. T"7al ton to a Mr. Ewing who told ~1r. Smith who 
told Mr. Woodland. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to 
the statement (T. 310) on the grounds that it was hearsay 
and further that it was inadmissible under the Statute of 
Frauds. (T. 311) Notwithstanding these objections, Hr. 
Woodland testified, "Why didn't you have the road reduced 
to 1 1/2:1?" Answer: "My superintendant told me that they 
were told to leave the road as it was. It constituted an 
access to a spring in the area." (T. 312) 
ON SITE C0NVERSATION THTH PLAINTIFF-APPELLA.."IT 
Rule 63 of the Rules of Evidence states: 
Evidence of a statement that is made other than by 
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay 
evidence and inadmissible except'. 
Thereafter there are exceptions listed to this rule. 
A review of those exceptions reveal that there is in fact 
no exceotion to cover this particular situation especially 
where it is hearsay on hearsay. Upon cross examination, 
Mr. \<7oodland admitted that the statement originated from 
Mr. Ewing who was not in the courtroom and had not been 
called as a witness. Nor did Mr. ~oodland himself hear 
the statement made by Mr. Ewing. TV[r. Woodland had sat through 
the deposition of Mr. Ewing on an earlier date and the 
statements of rtr. Ewing were read by Counsel to the plaintiff 
to '1r. r,Toodland. ~1r. Ewing had sa.id: 
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Q. In fact you couldn't identify this man, Mr. \val ton, 
(pointing) as being the one who came un? 
A. No. 
The hearsay on hearsay nature is borne out by the followir,-
testi..rnony: 
0. Now, you've got. .this is supposed to have come 
from a statement- from Mr. Ewing from .the man sitting 
on the cat operating at the time? 
A. I got the statement from Mr. Smith. 
0. Then Mr. Smith is supposed to have told you. 
That is, what one of the cat operators told you, 
is that right? 
A. Yes, I believe he did tell me that. 
(T. 331) 
The transcript continues to refer to the testimony 
of Mr. Ewing wherein he describes an individual who approached 
him driving a green pickup truck or other vehicle. (T. 331) 
The statement becomes less credible when one analyzes the 
fact that Mr. Ewing was not during the deposition able to 
recognize Mr. Walton as the individual that came uo to the 
site and made the statement to leave the roads as thev 
were (T. 332, line 9-18). This was hearsay on hearsav 
in that the statement was sunposed to have been made bv 
Mr. Walton to '1r. Ewing who made the statement to lllf.r. Smith 
who in turn made it to Mr. Tt./oodland, the one who was testi fyinc 
in the trial. (T. 333, line 13-18) 
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It is apparent that the defendants did not call Mr. 
Ewing as a witness because he was so confused and his 
testimony was absolutely worthless. However, they were 
able to,,ver the plaintiff's objection, obtain a clear 
statement fro!'l Mr. Noodland which was a self-serving statement 
and a highly prejudicial statement being made by an individual 
who was not the recipient of the conversation. This is the 
rankest kind of hearsay which is not subject to cross examination 
or impeachment and therefore was not admissible. 
On direct examination of Mr. Woodland, an objection 
was also raised by the plaintiff as to the Statute of 
Frauds (T. 311) wherein the provisions and terms of the 
Statute were enumerated. The testimony referred to above 
of '1r. Woodland would have the effect of vitiating the 
claims that the plaintiff has upon the property and the 
performance of the defendants pursuant thereto upon the 
termination of the lease. The following provision of the 
Statute of Frauds applies: 
(U.C.A. 25-5-1) An Estate or Interest in Real Property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases 
for term not exceeding one year, or any trust or 
power over or concerninq real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise than 
by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
(U.C.A. 25-5-3) Every contract for the leasing for 
a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of 
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
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unless the contract, or some note or a memorandum 
thereof is in writing subscribed by the party when 
a lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized in writing. 
It is obvious from these provisions that testimony 
concerning or relating to the alteration of the obligations 
of parties under a lease, the Judgment of October 23, 1969, 
and the Stipulation of July 7, 1967 is not properly admissible 
unless in writing. This is because the lease was for a term 
exceeding one year, it was concerning real property, ("in 
any manner relating thereto") and pertained to the "surrender" 
of the said premises. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's decision tends to protect the 
defendants herein from any liability due to acts or the 
inaction of Davis County Planning Commission in their failure 
to enforce the Excavation Ordinance of 1960. The effect 
of that kind of decision is to leave the Plaintiff-Appellant 
herein helpless in that he has been stripped of all rights 
to which he was entitled under the Judgment of October 23, 
1967 and the remedies under the Law of Waste. 
Whether or not the Court is willing to admit it, 
he has by such a decision established an equitable theorv 
of estoppel, stating in essence that since the Davis 
County ~lanning Commission failed to enforce the Ordinance, 
they cannot now come forth and enforce it because to do 
so would in some wav place the defendants in some disadvantage 
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or in some detriment. Such a theor~ may be a viable and 
acceptable theory when private oarties are involved, but 
becomes an invalid theory of law when aoplied against 
government agencies. The law is very clear on the fact 
that the governmental agency may not be estopped in enforcing 
an ordinance. 
Should the Court find that through some notion of 
proprietary function, Davis County Planning Commission 
does, in fact, have a prooertv interest in the oroperty 
in question, herein, and therefore estoppel is effective 
as against the Davis County Planning Commission, it is not 
available as against this Plaintiff-Aopellant, who was not 
a oartv to anv action, conduct, or inaction which went 
toward setting up the estoppel. To hold otherwise would 
be to establish a theory which reasonablv ounishes an 
individual for something of which he is not responsible. 
The Judgment of October 23, 1969 and/or the oral stiuulation 
of an open court of July 7, 1967 looked to a time in the 
future wherein both parties to the action were given 
certain considerations not previously created. On the one 
hand, the defendants herein were able to achieve an extension 
of a lease for another ten years, dating from 1965 to 1975. 
In consideration for that extension, on the other hand, 
the Plaintiff-Appellant and/or his successors in interest 
acquired a guarantee or that the property would be returned 
to a usable state and that the arbiter would be the Davis 
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County Planning Commission as of the termination date, 
May 18, 1975. 
The arbitor, Davis County Planning Commission, did, 
fol1owing the termination of the lease, attempt to arbitrate 
the situation. Careful studies were made, using exnerts, 
mainly the Davis Countv Engineer, Glen Austin, who together 
with other individuals made a field study and determined 
that the property was left in a condition which would cause 
wasting and would cause serious damage. There were already 
signs of serious erosion of the sluffing of the sidehills, 
of no vegetation, or anvthinq to stabilize the soils. 
That these conditions were extant was verified by the 
expert studies made by engineering firm of Byrd Engineering, 
using other experts, including Herb Schrieter, the Land 
Planner and Designer and Guy Alder, the Vegetation Expert. 
All of these individuals, experts in their field, emphatically 
described to the Court serious failures on the part of 
the defendants to comply with Davis County Planninq Commission 
requirements. 
~hile no decision was made regarding the question of 
defendant Fife's liability under the lease, nevertheless, 
the form o.f the lease and the obligations assumed by Fife 
as is apparent in their correspondence with Davis County 
Planning Commission, all point to the fact that Fife, rather 
than having a sublease under Kenneth F. Walton, in fact 
had an assignment of all rights of Kenneth F. r1al ton. 
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It is apparent that they considered the Judgment of October 23, 
1969 to be their own obligation, and it is further apparent 
that their lease terminated coincident and on the same 
date as the lease with Kenneth F. Walton. Under the law 
that constitutes an assignment instead of a sublease and 
consequently all rights and claims which the plaintiff 
may have against Kenneth F. t·7al ton he now has and would have 
against Fife Construction Company. 
It is true that the defendants never at any time 
filed a rehabilitation olan which is of little probative 
value to the central issue of whether they comolied with 
Davis County Planning Commission requirements with respect 
to terracing and surfacing. The evidence of their failure 
to file such a plan or to comply with the requirements of 
Planninq Directors in the oast could only be probative 
of the issue of whether or not they intended to do anything 
to rehabilitate the oroperty or return it to a usable 
state. One of the rather blatant and apparent deficiencies 
in the oleadings on file herein is the defendant's failure 
to file any ~otion to Dismiss the case under the theory 
of estoopel nor is said theorv affirmatively pled in the 
Answers as is necessary under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil nrocedure. Conse~uently, the issue of estoppel 
is not before the Court and the Court was not at liberty 
to issue its decision based upon such a theory. Notwithstanding 
this void in the defendants pleadings and prior pretrial 
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litigation, the Court went ahead on its own to estabfr 
such a defense for the defendant using as it did the ~ 
legal theories described herein. 
The Court also decided there was no waste per se~ 
the Statute or under the Davis Countv Excavation Ordi~ 
or under U.C.A. 78-28-2 (1953) because Fife was merelv 
following the customs and usage in the trade at the tiff' 
of the terMination of the lease and that thev followed 
this back through 1969. ~o where in the law is there~ 
provision or any corrunon law orinci!=>le which would estab: 
for the defendants a legal "excuse" or "justification' 
sufficient to relieve them from liabili tv under waste ,,, 
princinles. 
In order to establish waste cer se, it must be ~if 
1. That the ordinance or statute was violated. It is• 
that under subsections 1-1-1 •nuroose'' and subsection!· 
"Excavation and Backfilling" that the nrdinance was vioi 
2. It must be shown that the de-Fendant co1UJT1itted or 
omitted some action wltich would depreciate the value 
of the oroperty as it would return to the remainderman. 
The evidence is overwhelming as provided in trial thatt 
crooertv had been wasted and there is enorT11ous erosion: 
wasting of the prooerty. 3. It must be shown that the' 
is no excuse or justification for having violated the o: 
rvhile a oerson mav find legal excuse or justification bf' 
of the urgencv of the moment "custom and usage" in thei 
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is explicitlv and expressly excluded from the le~al categories 
of excuse or justi~ication. 
It is arrnarent that there was prejudicial error committed 
against the Dlaintiff-Aonellant by the Court in admitting 
hearsav statements and statements that were inadmissible 
under the Statute of Frauds. Nor were these statements 
such as would have been defined as harmless error. The 
statement of the former deceased Davis County Planning 
Commission Director, ,'lr. 1:1.odney Sutton, wherein he was 
puroorted to have accented defendant Fife's letter of 
nctober 7, 1971 and the sketches associated therewith as the 
orooer and acceptable rehabilitation plan of said defendant 
under the Ordinance was an examnle of prejudicial admission 
of a hearsav statement. This was further a prejudicial 
inadmissible statement in that it would in effect alter or 
change the obligation due and owing bv the defendants 
in reference to real oronerty. 
The second error of the Court was admitting the statement 
oF ~r. Clifford Woodland of Fife Construction Comoanv wherein 
he is purported heard Mr. Smith, who in turn heard Mr. Ewing, 
a caterpillar operator, who is purported to have heard 
Plaintiff-Apnellant herein, Mr. Walton, say that the 
rehabilitation excavations made hv the defendant was not to, 
in any way, affect the road up to the gravel nit. Based 
unon these claims, the defendants were attempting to establish 
that the Dlaintiff-Aonellant somehow obstructed their 
-51-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rehabilitation efforts and therebv thev are relieved from 
a oerformance thereunder. 
such a statement is a self-serving statement and is 
further subject to the rankest kind of hearsav objections 
in that it is a statement made by an individual outside 
of Court used to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
which was passed from one person to another until it was 
finallv ~rovided in open Court by Mr. Clifford Woodland. 
This particular statement is further objectionable 
in that it is a violation of the Statute of Frauds in that 
it is a statement which would alter the obligations of the 
nartv under the original lease and would, in effect, relieve 
defendants of their obligations to perform under the Judqment 
of 1969. In those terms and under those circumstances 
it was admitted illegally and in violation of the Rules of 
Evidence. There is no wav under those circumstances -!'.or 
the Plaintiff-Ap~ellant to cross-examine or to impeach 
the statement made or otherwise r_:irove that it was not made. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Counsel, however, ef-1'.ectively impeached 
it by use o-1'. the deposition of ~r. Ewing, the purported 
narty to whom such a statement was given. From the said 
deposition, it is obvious that the said declarant, Mr. Ewing, 
could not even recognize Mr. Walton as the individual who 
came to talk to him on that day, nor could he remember the 
car or the exact statement beinq made. He does, however, 
remember that his foreman had instructed him not to disturb 
the roads. 
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It is aoparent from what has been described in this 
brief that the decision of the Court was not legally sound 
and that the decision should be overruled and returned 
to the Court for proper disposition in consonance with 
the principles herein set forth, and further that the 
~laintiff-Appellant should have a ~udgment in his favor 
against the Defendant-Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1978. 
LYLE J. BARNES 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Village~ Professional Bullding 
47 North Main Suite #1 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Telephone: 376-8220 
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Respondant, 251 East 200 South, Clearfield, Utah 84015. 
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